Why an Iran-US agreement threatens Israel’s strategy

Israeli prime minster benjamin netanyahu

As diplomatic efforts between Washington and Tehran continue to inch forward, one thing has become increasingly clear: Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu views the prospect of a successful US-Iran agreement not as a diplomatic achievement but as a strategic setback.

For years, Netanyahu has built much of his regional and international agenda around portraying Iran as an existential threat that can only be contained through pressure, isolation and the constant threat of military force. A breakthrough agreement between the US and Iran would challenge that narrative. It would demonstrate that diplomacy, however imperfect, can achieve what years of confrontation could not: reducing tensions, opening channels of communication and lowering the risk of a wider regional war.

That is precisely why Netanyahu is expected to use every political, diplomatic and media tool at his disposal to undermine any agreement that emerges from the ongoing negotiations. His objective is not merely to criticize the deal’s provisions. Rather, it is to prevent the agreement from taking root altogether and to drag the parties back to the cycle of mistrust and confrontation that has defined relations for decades.

The “Israeli warmonger” has a long history of opposing diplomatic engagement with Tehran. From public speeches and lobbying campaigns to direct appeals to American lawmakers, Netanyahu has consistently argued against negotiations that could normalize relations between Iran and the West. His calculation has remained largely unchanged: a permanent state of confrontation with Iran reinforces Israel’s strategic position and keeps international attention focused on Tehran rather than on other pressing regional issues.

Netanyahu is expected to use every political, diplomatic and media tool at his disposal to undermine any agreement

Hani Hazaimeh

From Netanyahu’s perspective, the success of a US-Iran agreement would represent a political defeat of two halves.

The first half would be the agreement itself. Any understanding that reduces hostilities between Washington and Tehran weakens the argument that military pressure is the only viable option. It also limits Israel’s ability to rally international support for aggressive measures against Iran. It reduces the likelihood of broader regional confrontation, a scenario that some within Israel’s political establishment have long viewed as strategically advantageous.

The second half of the defeat lies in the reports that Washington’s efforts to contain escalation in Lebanon have become part of a broader framework of understandings with Tehran. If the US succeeds in restraining military operations and preventing a wider war on the Lebanese front, it would further diminish Israel’s ability to shape regional dynamics through military escalation.

For Netanyahu, this could be particularly frustrating. The continuation of military pressure in Lebanon has often been presented as necessary to restore deterrence and address security concerns. Yet American intervention aimed at limiting the scope of conflict suggests that Washington increasingly prioritizes regional stability over the expansion of military campaigns.

This emerging reality places Netanyahu in a difficult position. He finds himself confronting not only Iran’s negotiating team but also an American administration that appears increasingly interested in preventing another prolonged Middle Eastern conflict. While Washington and Tehran remain far from resolving all their differences, both sides appear to recognize the enormous costs of continued escalation.

The broader region certainly understands those costs.

The Gulf states, along with many other Arab countries, have repeatedly expressed support for diplomatic solutions over military confrontation. Their economies, security interests and development agendas depend on stability rather than perpetual crisis. They have little interest in becoming collateral damage in a struggle between regional and international powers.

Diplomacy should not be judged against an impossible standard of perfection. It should be judged against the alternative

Hani Hazaimeh

This is why efforts to sabotage diplomacy should concern everyone in the region. The Middle East has already paid an extraordinary price for decades of conflict, proxy wars and political brinkmanship. Every missed opportunity for dialogue has ultimately produced more instability, more destruction and more uncertainty.

None of this suggests that a US-Iran agreement would be perfect. No agreement ever is. Deep disagreements would remain and implementation would undoubtedly face challenges. Yet diplomacy should not be judged against an impossible standard of perfection. It should be judged against the alternative.

And the alternative is clear: renewed confrontation, expanding military operations, greater regional polarization and the ever-present risk of a conflict that could engulf multiple countries.

As negotiations continue, Netanyahu may indeed play every card available to derail a deal he considers harmful to Israel’s interests. He may attempt to mobilize political allies, amplify fears and create obstacles designed to return the process to square one.

The real question, however, is whether the region is willing to allow the opponents of diplomacy to dictate its future once again.

The Middle East stands at a crossroads between escalation and engagement. Those invested in perpetual confrontation will continue to resist compromise. But for a region exhausted by conflict, the success of diplomacy — even imperfect diplomacy — offers a far more promising path than another generation of wars.

If an agreement ultimately emerges, its greatest achievement may not be what it says on paper. Its greatest achievement may be proving that dialogue can still prevail over those who profit politically from endless crises.

BY: Writer Hani Hazaimeh is a senior editor based in Amman.

Disclaimer: Views expressed by writers in this section are their own and do not necessarily reflect The Times Union‘ point of view