Washington’s smartest move is to keep Israel out of the war

Involving Israel directly in military operations against Iran would fundamentally alter the nature of the conflict.

As tensions between the US and Iran continue to escalate, Washington faces a strategic choice that could determine whether the current confrontation remains a limited military operation or evolves into a broader regional conflict.

At the heart of that decision lies one crucial question: Should Israel become a direct participant in the war?

The answer, from both a military and political perspective, should be no.

For all the strength of the US-Israeli alliance, involving Israel directly in military operations against Iran would fundamentally alter the nature of the conflict. What is currently framed as a confrontation with defined military and strategic objectives could quickly transform into a wider regional war, driven by multiple agendas and increasingly difficult to control. Once that transition occurs, Washington’s ability to dictate the pace, scope, and eventual endgame of the conflict would diminish considerably.

President Donald Trump has consistently demonstrated a preference for maintaining control over escalation rather than allowing events to dictate American strategy. Despite his willingness to use military force when necessary, his approach has generally favored operations with clear objectives over open-ended military campaigns. That strategic discipline would be severely tested if Israel entered the battlefield as an active participant.

Iran has long sought to portray every regional confrontation through the prism of its conflict with Israel. Whenever Tehran faces growing international pressure or military setbacks, it attempts to shift the narrative from its own actions to what it describes as a broader struggle against Israel and its Western allies. Bringing Israel into the current conflict would hand Tehran exactly the political narrative it has spent decades trying to construct.

Instead of defending its own conduct, Iran would be able to recast itself as the leader of resistance against Israel, redirecting attention away from the original causes of the conflict. Such a shift would resonate across parts of the region, energize Iranian-backed proxy groups, complicate diplomatic efforts, and make deescalation significantly more difficult.

The challenge for Washington extends beyond Iran’s propaganda. It also concerns the broader international coalition the US may need if the crisis deepens.

Should Washington seek to build or expand a coalition involving Arab partners, Israel’s direct participation would dramatically increase the political cost for many governments considering joining such an effort. Although several countries have strengthened relations with Israel in recent years, public opinion throughout much of the region remains highly sensitive to military cooperation involving Israel.

Governments that might otherwise support US security objectives could face significant domestic political pressure if the conflict became widely perceived as an American-Israeli war rather than a limited operation addressing specific security threats.

Successful coalitions are built not only on shared military interests but also political legitimacy. The broader the coalition, the stronger its diplomatic credibility and operational flexibility. Introducing Israel into the battlefield risks weakening both. Instead of expanding international support, Washington could find itself narrowing its diplomatic options, while simultaneously strengthening Iran’s political messaging.

The US is primarily concerned with containing escalation, protecting its forces and allies, safeguarding international navigation, and preserving regional stability. Israel’s priorities, while overlapping in many respects, are necessarily broader and more immediate. Israel views Iran not only through the lens of current hostilities but also as a long-term strategic threat involving nuclear ambitions, ballistic missile capabilities, and an extensive network of regional proxies.

President Donald Trump has consistently demonstrated a preference for maintaining control over escalation rather than allowing events to dictate American strategy.

Hani Hazaimeh

Conflating these two agendas would make defining success considerably more difficult. A limited campaign could gradually evolve into a broader military effort aimed at fundamentally reshaping Iran’s regional posture — an objective carrying far greater risks and uncertain outcomes.

Fortunately for Washington, there is little indication that Israel is likely to disregard US preferences under current circumstances.

The strategic relationship between the US and Israel is built on an extraordinary level of military coordination, intelligence sharing, technological cooperation, and political consultation. While Israel retains complete sovereignty over its national security decisions, major military operations of regional significance rarely occur without close coordination with Washington.

Given that level of strategic dependence, Israel is unlikely to launch a major campaign against Iran contrary to American wishes so long as Israel itself remains outside the conflict.

There is, however, one scenario capable of changing that calculation almost overnight.

If Iran were to launch a direct attack against Israel — even a single missile or drone strike that successfully reaches its target — the crisis would move beyond Israel’s accepted threshold of deterrence. At that point, Israeli leaders would almost certainly conclude that failing to respond decisively would undermine the credibility of Israeli deterrence.

Such a response would likely involve several days of sustained military operations, including extensive airstrikes against Iranian military infrastructure and potentially targeted assassinations of senior commanders responsible for the attack. The objective would be to restore deterrence quickly and convince Tehran that any direct attack on Israel carries unacceptable costs.

While such retaliation would be entirely predictable from Israel’s perspective, it would also dramatically expand the conflict and significantly reduce opportunities for diplomatic containment.

Wars rarely expand because of careful planning. More often, they grow because political leaders fail to recognize the consequences of introducing additional actors whose priorities differ from their own. Every new participant adds another set of political calculations, military objectives, and domestic pressures, making escalation increasingly difficult to reverse.

The US still enjoys an important strategic advantage: It largely controls the tempo and direction of the current crisis. Preserving that advantage requires resisting decisions that unnecessarily broaden the theater of operations or blur the distinction between American strategic goals and Israel’s legitimate, but distinct, security concerns.

If Washington’s objective is to contain Iran, preserve regional stability, maintain international support, and avoid another prolonged Middle Eastern conflict, then keeping Israel outside the direct theater of war is not merely a tactical choice — it is a strategic necessity.

BY: Hani Hazaimeh is a senior editor based in Amman.

Disclaimer: Views expressed by writers in this section are their own and do not necessarily reflect The Times Union‘ point of view