Saudi Arabia recently announced the creation of a multinational maritime defense coalition to help safeguard freedom of navigation in the Red Sea and the Bab Al-Mandeb Strait. Fourteen countries backed the initiative in a joint statement, including Turkiye.
During a telephone call with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan welcomed the establishment of the Saudi-led multinational maritime defense alliance and wished it success in achieving its objectives. He also reaffirmed Turkiye’s condemnation of attacks by the Houthi militia in Yemen against vessels in the Red Sea, and expressed his country’s full support for the Kingdom.
The supporting states have agreed to complete the internal procedures necessary for formal adoption of the coalition’s charter, in line with each country’s constitutional and legal procedures. Although Ankara has not officially joined the initiative, its backing — as the only NATO member country — is significant and driven by some important factors.
The first of these is Turkiye’s relations with Saudi Arabia. Support for the Saudi-led initiative reinforces the political alignment between Ankara and Riyadh, which has now expanded through a solid defense and economic partnership.
With the understanding of regional ownership, which is something the Turkish political elite always underlines, Turkiye attempts to address regional issues with regional states, among which Saudi Arabia is a heavyweight with whom Turkiye shares membership of significant platforms such as the G20 and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation. Moreover, they have common concerns, now more than ever.
Turkiye’s defense cooperation with Saudi Arabia has grown over the past few years as the countries’ geopolitical ambitions have aligned
Dr. Sinem Cengiz
The founding states said the establishment of the defense coalition represented a strategic step toward strengthening maritime security in the Bab Al-Mandeb Strait, the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, while also deepening defense cooperation among member states.
Turkiye’s defense cooperation with Saudi Arabia has grown over the past few years as the countries’ geopolitical ambitions have aligned, from Somalia to Yemen and many other places.
Turkiye is also part of the quadrilateral grouping of nations that also includes Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Egypt. However, the Saudi-Turkish alignment is more about middle-power activism.
There has also been a surge in logistics activity between Riyadh and Ankara that is moving beyond conventional bilateral cooperation with the signing of memorandums of understanding on railways and logistics operations.
The second factor is regional influence. Given the shifting regional context since Oct. 7, 2023, Turkiye is not trying to dominate the region through unilateral initiatives but is instead part of several regional initiatives, whether related to Gaza or connectivity projects. The maritime coalition is another such initiative.
Despite having no direct proximity to the Red Sea or the Strait of Hormuz, Turkiye has military, diplomatic and economic interests stretching from the Eastern Mediterranean to the Horn of Africa. It maintains a major military base in Somalia and has long sought a larger security role in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden region.
However, Ankara’s strategy for these area is evolving from the bilateral to the regional, through a coordinated strategy with Saudi Arabia and the other countries in the region. Turkiye aims to strengthen its presence along critical maritime trade routes, and focus on expanding its influence over key ports in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea.
The strategic significance of the Red Sea and Bab Al-Mandeb Strait to the Turkish economy and its maritime trade cannot be overstated; a large share of Turkiye’s trade with Asia and East Africa passes through both. Insecurity in the Red Sea affects Turkish interests by decreasing the number of containers arriving at ports in the Eastern Mediterranean and increasing the costs. Ankara therefore has a strong interest in protecting freedom of navigation in regional choke points.
The third factor, also worth noting, is that this coalition appears to be framed as a defensive maritime security mission rather than an offensive force. According to the launch announcement, its focus will be on protection of commercial shipping, sharing intelligence, and coordination of patrols in response to Houthi attacks on Saudi-linked and other commercial vessels.
In this regard, Turkiye’s support is more significant politically than militarily. The coalition could have been formed without Ankara; having its strong backing, however, and the fact that it is the only NATO member, changes the coalition’s international signaling.
Yet we must remember that Turkiye is supporting this initiative as Turkiye alone, not on behalf of NATO, which has no obligation to or formal role within the coalition. Still, Turkiye brings with it things no other participant does, such as advanced naval capabilities, intelligence-sharing experience, and a navy that regularly operates beyond its immediate neighborhood.
Ankara has invested heavily in expanding its naval capabilities over the past two decades. Participating in multinational maritime-security missions provides the Turkish Naval Forces with operational experience and demonstrates their ability to contribute beyond the Eastern Mediterranean.
Turkiye relies on its strong naval capabilities, therefore, which positions it as a significant actor in initiatives related to maritime security.
Also, its backing changes perceptions of the coalition; it neither looks like an extension of Western strategy, nor does it appear to be directed against any particular country. Rather, it looks like a broader regional security effort focusing on freedom of navigation.
Beyond the immediate security rationale, Turkiye’s support for the Saudi-led initiative demonstrates a broader willingness to contribute to collective security arrangements led by regional actors instead of external powers. This aligns with Turkiye’s long-standing emphasis on regional ownership and strategic autonomy in efforts to address regional crises.
In short, Ankara’s support is driven not only by the need to protect trade routes, but also to support a key regional partner and reinforce its own role as a significant maritime power with interests that extend from the Eastern Mediterranean to the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea.
BY: Writer Dr. Sinem Cengiz is a Turkish political analyst who specializes in Turkiye’s relations with the Middle East.
Disclaimer: Views expressed by writers in this section are their own and do not necessarily reflect The Times Union‘ point of view
