Africa enters 2026 carrying more weight than momentum. The continent is no longer operating on the margins of global disorder; it is inside it, shaped by it and, at times, exploited by it. The question of whether Africa will be affected by the fracturing of the global system is as distant as it is moot. If anything, the priority now is whether African states can convert disorder into room to maneuver or else risk a drift into managed decline.
First on the agenda is a harrowing continental security dynamic, which is perhaps the most unforgiving place to begin. Armed conflict now affects more African countries than at any point in the past two decades. Sudan alone has lost an estimated 400,000 lives since 2023, with nearly 13 million people displaced and the country fractured into rival zones of control that resemble war economies more than states. The implications go well beyond Sudan’s borders. Chad, South Sudan, Ethiopia, Egypt and Libya are already absorbing the shock through refugee flows, weapons diffusion and proxy entanglements. Sudan is no longer a single crisis — it has become an engine of instability for an entire subregion.
Adjacent to the Horn of Africa’s woes is the perennially unstable Sahel, which is now considered the most lethal zone of militant violence worldwide. More than half of all deaths linked to terror groups on the continent occur there, with civilians accounting for the majority. Since military takeovers in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, fatalities have surged rather than declined. In Burkina Faso, deaths linked to extremist violence have nearly tripled in three years, while the state now exercises effective control over a fraction of its territory. The promise that juntas would restore order has given way to siege warfare, mass displacement and deepening isolation.
One million Africans enter the labor force every month, yet fewer than one in four find work in the formal economy. Hafed Al-Ghwell
Moreover, Africa’s conflicts are no longer insulated from one another. Fighters, weapons, tactics and financing now move across regions with frightening speed. Somalia’s armed groups are drawing material and training from Yemen. Extremist cells in Nigeria are one of multiple nodes converging with criminal networks once focused on kidnapping and resource theft in a sprawling transnational network connecting North Africa with sub-Saharan Africa. Even at the heart of Africa, the eastern Congo crisis, following the fall of Goma and Bukavu to M23 forces, carries echoes of the late 1990s, when regional armies turned Congolese territory into a battlefield by proxy. More than 2.5 million people have been displaced there this year alone.
Worse yet, the unchecked proliferation of lethal technologies is amplifying these dangers. Drones, once monopolized by states, are now in the hands of militias, insurgents and criminal groups in at least nine African countries. Nearly all recorded drone strikes are concentrated in six conflict zones, often hitting dense urban areas. Cheap, adaptable and hard to counter, these systems allow armed actors to punch far above their weight. The result is a shift in warfare toward cities, where civilian harm multiplies and political fallout accelerates.
Elsewhere, governance trends offer little comfort. Since 2020, nine African countries have experienced military seizures of power. More than a third of today’s African leaders came to office through coups or armed action. Elections increasingly function as rituals rather than checks on authority. Of the 10 national polls held this year, only three were widely viewed as credible. Where repression deepens, corruption follows. Authoritarian governments on the continent rank far worse on corruption indices than their democratic peers, with direct consequences for investment, jobs and service delivery.
The governance slide matters because Africa’s demographic pressures are relentless. One million Africans enter the labor force every month, yet fewer than one in four find work in the formal economy. The continent is urbanizing faster than any other region, adding about 45 million city dwellers each year. Nearly 600 African cities recorded fatalities linked to organized violence this year. Urban anger is rising faster than urban opportunity, fueling youth-led protests that demand accountability but often collide with entrenched power. In several cases, these protests have met with bullets or coups, not reform.
Yet Africa is not without counterweights.
Even amid conflict, the continent continues to build. The African Continental Free Trade Area now counts 48 ratifying states and could raise intra-African trade by more than 50 percent when fully implemented. More than 16,000 km of new roads and 2 million km of fiber-optic cable have been laid under continental infrastructure programs. Regional power pools are slowly beginning to trade electricity across borders. Even high-speed rail networks, though incomplete, are no longer aspirational.
Africa is also venturing into humanity’s last frontier, space. More than 20 African countries now operate space programs. Sixty-five satellites are already in orbit, with more than 100 more planned by 2030. These assets matter not for prestige but for agriculture, climate monitoring, border control and communications. In a world where data defines power, this is a foundation, however fragile.
Looking ahead to 2026 and beyond, Africa’s prospects hinge on three choices. First, whether states continue to trade sovereignty for regime survival by inviting external patrons to manage their security. Second, whether urban youth are treated as political stakeholders or security threats. Third, whether integration efforts are allowed to mature beyond paper commitments.
Africa will not rise uniformly, nor will it collapse wholesale. More likely, it will fragment into zones of progress and zones of attrition. In a world of competing power centers and thinning global rules, the states that endure will be those that reduce internal exclusion, diversify partnerships without dependency and invest in legitimacy rather than force alone.
The margin for error is narrowing. Africa’s future will be decided less by global trends than by how African leaders respond to them.
BY: Hafed Al-Ghwell is senior fellow and program director at the Stimson Center in Washington and senior fellow at the Center for Conflict and Humanitarian Studies.
Disclaimer: Views expressed by writers in this section are their own and do not necessarily reflect The Times Union‘ point of view
