Many Western commentators, unable to resist a complicated explanation for a simple problem, have offered a whole menu of theories for the recent Saudi-Emirati tensions. Some make for a neat story. Most miss the point.
The strain between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi is simply rooted in national security. Specifically, it stems from the UAE’s conduct in Yemen and Sudan, which Saudi officials increasingly view as destabilizing and directly threatening the Kingdom. Online sniping and narrative warfare may raise the temperature, but they are symptoms. The cause is the strategic impact of policies in two conflict zones where Saudi Arabia bears the greatest exposure.
That is why the many framings of this rift get it wrong. Riyadh’s concern is not where a consulting firm places its regional office, nor is it a desire to “downsize” the UAE in regional politics. The issue is whether a close partner is widening security risks on Saudi Arabia’s periphery while still benefiting from the optics of Gulf unity.
Riyadh has prioritized Yemeni stability
Ali Shihabi
Start with Yemen. Saudi Arabia and the UAE entered the conflict in 2015 to restore the internationally recognized government and prevent Yemen from collapsing into a hostile militia state on the Kingdom’s southern border. Yemen is not a distant theater for Riyadh. A failed Yemeni state means porous borders, weapons proliferation, criminal networks, and permanent openings for hostile actors in Saudi Arabia’s backyard.
Over time, the coalition’s unity frayed over the end-state. Riyadh has prioritized Yemeni stability under a single, internationally recognized central government able to control territory and secure borders. The UAE, by contrast, cultivated close relationships with powerful southern forces whose objectives have often been to weaken that government’s authority and entrench fragmentation.
For Saudi Arabia, this is the difference between a Yemen that can police its territory and a patchwork of militias with competing sponsors and shifting loyalties, an ecosystem that rewards keeping the state weak. Saudi Arabia can live with tactical and commercial differences with the UAE. What it cannot accept is a partner empowering local actors whose incentives are to keep Yemen fragmented, weak, and perpetually negotiable.
For the Kingdom, security has to come first
Ali Shihabi
Sudan, across the Red Sea from the Kingdom, presents a parallel concern. Instability there spills into the Red Sea basin and the Horn of Africa, regions Saudi Arabia considers part of its strategic depth. A fractured Sudan threatens maritime security along one of the world’s most important corridors and pulls neighboring states into a widening zone of disorder.
Events on the ground have sharpened these fears. The rebel Rapid Support Forces’ campaign culminating in the fall of El-Fasher was accompanied by atrocities that a UN Human Rights Office report said may amount to war crimes and possible crimes against humanity. The report urged influential states to help stop weapons transfers that could enable further abuses. The core issue is whether Sudan returns to a viable state or normalizes militia rule, and militia rule is a contagion.
Human rights groups and investigative reporting have alleged that external backing has helped sustain the RSF, including allegations of Emirati support, which the UAE denies. Reuters has reported claims that a secret training camp in Ethiopia prepared RSF fighters and that the UAE financed and supported activity linked to that effort. Abu Dhabi also rejected those allegations. Saudi policymakers do not need certainty about every claim to see the strategic risk: A militia supplied well enough to fight indefinitely will keep Sudan broken, and a broken Sudan destabilizes the Red Sea neighborhood.
From Riyadh’s perspective, Yemen and Sudan are not side theaters. They are front lines of a Saudi approach that favors strengthening states over empowering militias and building regional order over proxy politics. The rift is not ideological. Saudi Arabia and the UAE remain aligned on many broad objectives, including countering extremism, modernization, diversification, and strong ties with Western partners. The dispute is about methods, and about whether commitments in shared security arenas are real or merely situational.
That distinction changes the prognosis. If the rift were about ideology or economics, it would imply prolonged structural competition. But if it is rooted in Yemen and Sudan, it is solvable, provided Abu Dhabi treats Saudi security sensitivities with the seriousness they deserve.
The path back is clear. In Yemen, it requires genuine alignment around a shared end-state: empowering the internationally recognized government, ending unilateral support to local armed actors that undermines state authority and deepens fragmentation, and pursuing a credible political track to address the question of South Yemen’s future status. In Sudan, it requires convergence behind a ceasefire and a political process that strengthens central government institutions rather than rewarding militia rule, alongside serious, verifiable steps to halt arms flows and logistics that prolong the civil war.
The Saudi-UAE relationship has weathered disagreements before, and it can do so again. But clarity about the cause is essential. This is not a battle over business districts or diplomatic ties. It is a test of whether Gulf partnerships are anchored in shared security outcomes. For Saudi Arabia, security has to come first.
BY: Writer Ali Shihabi is an author and commentator on the politics and economics of Saudi Arabia.
Disclaimer: Views expressed by writers in this section are their own and do not necessarily reflect The Times Union‘ point of view
