Saudi Defense Minister Prince Khaled bin Salman’s White House meetings with US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth and Middle East Special Envoy Steve Witkoff last week addressed several key issues.
The discussions included strategic bilateral relations, the trajectory of the Saudi-American partnership and mechanisms for its enhancement, alongside examining efforts to establish peace regionally and globally.
The senior Saudi delegation arrived at a critical juncture, with American warships deployed across the Arabian Gulf and escalating possibilities of coordinated US-Israeli military strikes against Iran.
Through this visit, Riyadh aimed to cement its alliance with the US within crisis-management parameters, while establishing firm boundaries against any escalatory trajectory that could ignite a “Gulf theater” with unmanageable consequences that potentially jeopardize vital energy interests and supply chains.
Two days prior, on Jan. 27, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman received a call from Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian. The crown prince declared that “the Kingdom will not permit its airspace or territory for any military operations against the Islamic Republic of Iran,” while reaffirming Saudi support for “resolving differences through dialogue.”
Pezeshkian reciprocated with “gratitude to the Kingdom for its steadfast stance” and recognition of “the crown prince’s contributions toward achieving security and stability.
This transparent, energetic Saudi diplomacy stops short of offering Tehran’s regime a kiss of life or complimentary lifeline
Hassan Al-Mustafa
This transparent, energetic Saudi diplomacy stops short of offering Tehran’s regime a kiss of life or complimentary lifeline absent fundamental, structural shifts in its foreign policy, particularly regarding Riyadh’s paramount concerns: Iran’s meddling in internal affairs, its backing of sleeper cells and armed militias, its ballistic missile program, and its nuclear ambitions.
Through the 2023 Beijing Agreement framework, the Kingdom has pushed Iran toward policies grounded in good neighborliness, positioning it among the regional powers contributing to development, economic well-being and collective security.
Riyadh’s approach substitutes isolation with direct engagement — dialogue intended to be candid and results-oriented rather than superficial courtesy or image management. Consequently, these four dossiers represent, sequentially, Riyadh’s fundamental stance toward Tehran.
According to distinguished Saudi political commentator Abdulrahman Al-Rashed in his Asharq Al-Awsat piece “What will Iran become?” there are conditions, which include the hard-line faction aligned with the Revolutionary Guards ceasing interference in internal Saudi matters, terminating support for “armed cells,” and fundamentally recalibrating relationships with regional “substate actors.”
In addition, Iran should construct a “political and military doctrine” not predicated on threatening neighboring nations and commit to civilian nuclear programs without developing nuclear weapons capacity.
Then, “once objective conditions emerge in subsequent phases, substantial room exists for both nations to forge productive, constructive relations enhancing regional stability,” Al-Rashed wrote.
In that same article, Al-Rashed observed that “Saudi Arabia and Iran are neighboring powers representing the region’s two pivotal axes,” arguing that “Iran under ‘normal circumstances’ possesses the potential to achieve wealth comparable to Gulf states without plundering Iraqi resources or extorting the West.”
He continued: “It will rival us in energy markets, which should spur us to advance our economy, output and scientific and educational capacities.”
Realizing Al-Rashed’s prospective vision demands an adaptable, enduring transformation in the Tehran regime’s inflexible political outlook.
Iran should assess the power dynamics pragmatically and work to persuade the US of its partnership capacity
Hassan Al-Mustafa
This should be manifested through concrete actions and reformed approaches toward Arab neighbors and the US, because “today’s developments represent neither transient escalation nor sudden crisis,” according to specialist Iranian affairs journalist Ali Hashem.
Hashem contends we face “a moment in which a confrontation spanning the Iranian revolution’s entire existence is intensifying. Across nearly five decades, relations have fluctuated between open conflict and temporary thaw, yet the fundamental disagreement has remained constant.”
He maintains “the dispute was never technical regarding nuclear matters, missiles or even regional sway, but political and ideological concerning Iran’s regional positioning and the limits of its acceptance within the international order, with its Israel stance at the core.
“The other issues have functioned, across most periods, as tools for exerting pressure and managing conflict, not as its ultimate cause.”
These circumstances demand Iran assess the power dynamics pragmatically and work to persuade President Donald Trump’s administration of its partnership capacity, enabling it, through direct channels and via intermediaries, to tip Trump’s calculus toward negotiation over military engagement.
Warfare will probably not dislodge Iran’s regime, though it would substantially debilitate it and generate acute social fractures, potentially yielding counterproductive outcomes, as some predict.
What remains certain, however, is universal interest in a change that leads to regional relaxation and internal reform, without chaos, the disintegration of state infrastructure or the ascendance of an extremist leadership that launches aggression against Arab neighbors.
Will Tehran’s governing elite, particularly Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, execute audacious decisions that avert the threats to Iran and the region, while stripping justifications from Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu?
Will Trump offer the Iranians an arrangement preserving state prestige while declawing the wounded lion without destroying it, compelling Iran’s integration into a regional framework upholding security, peace and development?
The answers are likely in the coming days.
BY: Hassan Al-Mustafa is a Saudi writer and researcher interested in Islamic movements, the development of religious discourse, and the relationship between GCC states and Iran.
Disclaimer: Views expressed by writers in this section are their own and do not necessarily reflect The Times Union‘ point of view
