It is becoming increasingly apparent that a viable framework for European defense and security cooperation will require establishing something like the old Western European Union, the 10-member bloc that ceased operations in 2011. Many would counter that we already have the EU and NATO and that, whatever one cannot do, the other can. But this argument no longer holds water. Recent developments have made clear that neither NATO nor the EU is fully suited to meeting the evolving challenges Europe faces.
Consider Ukraine. On the one hand, the EU is playing a vital role in providing financial assistance to that beleaguered country. It has rapidly improved cooperation among its defense industries and opened a pathway for eventual Ukrainian accession. On the other hand, it ends up paralyzed whenever just one or two member states veto its decisions.
Worse, NATO has long been key to Europe’s territorial defense but the US’ commitment to the alliance — and especially to European security — is increasingly in doubt, as the White House’s designs on Greenland, a sovereign territory of NATO and EU member Denmark, have made clear. As a result, dialogue among NATO member states is no longer as relevant as it once was, especially on the matter of Russia’s war in Ukraine.
That is why new, informal frameworks have already been taking shape on the sidelines. Over the past year, the coalition of the willing that emerged to maintain support for Ukraine has become increasingly important. Many now refer to it with capital letters: the Coalition of the Willing. While the US unilaterally pursues incoherent frameworks to end the fighting, key European countries have been meeting under this new banner to articulate a more serious long-term policy.
The coalition of the willing that emerged to maintain support for Ukraine has become increasingly important
Carl Bildt
One of the coalition’s distinct advantages is that it includes the UK and Norway, while excluding Hungary, whose pro-Russian prime minister, Viktor Orban, has consistently frustrated EU-level responses to the war. Its informal leadership, an “E3” triumvirate of Britain, France and Germany, now meets fairly regularly, demonstrating that it fulfills a need that neither the EU nor NATO can.
So, why not take the logical next step of creating a new version of the old Western European Union? By the time it was formally dissolved nearly 15 years ago, its remaining functions had been taken over by the EU, whose mandate and structures had extended to include security and defense policy. In fact, the mutual defense clause (Article 42.7) in the EU’s Treaty of Lisbon was copy and pasted from the Western European Union treaty and goes further than the collective defense clause (Article 5) of the North Atlantic Treaty.
But then came Brexit. The UK left the EU because a narrow majority of voters believed the argument that their country would fare better alone, even in a more turbulent world. Ten years later, it is now abundantly obvious that this was a mistake. Not only is Britain smaller and weaker, but so too is the EU. As an EU member state, the UK had played a key role in shaping the common policies of a bloc that mattered on the world stage. When it left, this major source of relevance dried up.
Since the new Western European Union already exists de facto, would it not make sense to institutionalize it formally?
Carl Bildt
But given the challenge posed by Russia’s war on Ukraine, shaping an effective European response without the UK simply was not realistic. With the makings of the Coalition of the Willing already present, the new E3 triumvirate emerged and quickly rose in strategic importance. NATO was too busy trying to stay onside with US President Donald Trump to develop much of a policy response and the EU struggled with Hungarian and Slovakian obstructionism.
Since the new Western European Union already exists de facto, would it not make sense to institutionalize it formally? At a minimum, the question should be seriously considered. The key countries of Western Europe — however we want to define that term — need a firmer framework not only for coordinating policies on Russia and Ukraine. They also need to counter American bullying, exemplified by the announcement of now-abandoned additional tariffs on European countries for opposing the proposed annexation of Greenland.
There are many ways to institutionalize a new Western European Union without building big structures and excessively complicated arrangements — and without further undermining or duplicating either the EU or NATO. What matters is that those who are still willing to defend Western values do something. The first year of Trump’s second administration has forced this reckoning upon Europe. With three more years to go, dithering is not an option. Establishing a new Western European Union should be high on the agenda, because European security cannot wait.
BY: Carl Bildt is a former prime minister and foreign minister of Sweden.
Disclaimer: Views expressed by writers in this section are their own and do not necessarily reflect The Times Union‘ point of view
